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Abstract
This paper examines the role of the open economy in determining
robust rules when the central bank fears various model misspecication
errors. A new Keynesian model is calibrated to ￿t the economies of
three archetypal open economy in￿ ation targeters ￿ Australia, Canada
and New Zealand. Robust policies respond more aggressively to not
only the exchange rate, but also in￿ ation, the output gap and their
associated shocks. This result generalizes to the context of a ￿ exible
in￿ ation targeting central bank that cares about the volatility of the
real exchange rate. However, when the central bank places only a small
weight on interest rate smoothing and fears misspeci￿cation in only
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1exchange rate determination, a more aggressive response to the lag of
the exchange rate is not warranted. It is shown that the bene￿ts of an
exchange rate channel far outweigh the concomitant costs of uncertain
exchange rate determination.
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1 Introduction
Thinking about best practice monetary policy for policymakers means think-
ing about uncertainty. Alan Greenspan, Governor of the Federal Reserve
Board exempli￿es this perspective:
The Federal Reserve￿ s experiences over the past two decades
make it clear that uncertainty is not just a pervasive feature of
the monetary policy landscape; it is the de￿ning characteristic
of that landscape.1
Monetary policymakers operating in an open economy face an additional
source of uncertainty ￿ the exchange rate.2 The goal of this paper is to
identify policy rules robust to the uncertainty around model dynamics open
economy in￿ ation targeters face in practice. An open economy model with
an explicit in￿ ation targeting framework is calibrated to match the data for
three archetypal small open in￿ ation targeters, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand. These countries are among the earliest in￿ ation explicit in￿ ation
targeters and now form a useful dataset for identifying the open economy
1Address to the Meetings of the American Economic Association, January 3, 2004.?
2Meese and Rogo⁄ (1983)? note the exchange rate is extremely di¢ cult to distinguish
from a random walk. West (2003)? aptly relabels UIP ￿Uncertain Interest rate Parity￿ .
2dynamics in￿ ation targeters face in practice and rules robust to uncertainty
around these dynamics.
Thinking about uncertainty has a long history in economics dating back
at least as far as Knight (1924). For Knight (1924)?, uncertainty di⁄ers
from risk because the policymaker does not know the nature of the uncer-
tainty and is unable to form a probability distribution or risk statement,
over di⁄erent possible models. Hansen and Sargent (2004) apply Knight￿ s
(1924) philosophy to the linear-quadratic control framework, recognizing
that policymakers work with models which are approximations to some true,
unknown model and seek a rule that is robust to models close to the poli-
cymaker￿ s best approximation.
Several researchers seek rules robust to dynamics in the neighbourhood
of a single speci￿c model.3 Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) study ro-
bust policies within the context of a forward-looking closed economy model,
similar to the wage-contracting model of Fuhrer and Moore (1995)?. They
conclude that under unstructured uncertainty, where model misspeci￿cation
arises in the local vicinity of a single model, the implied policy rule is more
aggressive than the case where the estimated model is assumed to be the
true model. Onatski and Stock (2002)? who use the Rudebusch and Svens-
son (1999) model to compare generalized Taylor-type rules that are robust
to speci￿cations of uncertainty. Within this model, the robust rule is more
aggressive than the standard case with no model uncertainty.
3See for example, Onatski and Stock (2002)?, Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) ?,
Hansen et al. (1999) ? or the macroeconomic models in Hansen and Sargent (2002), inter
alia.
3While there exist some open economy robust control policy experiments
most of the literature focuses on the closed economy.4 This paper calibrates
an open economy model to capture the key features of the open economy
dynamics for three in￿ ation targeters and thus forms the laboratory for
identifying monetary policy rules for open economy in￿ ation targeters robust
to model uncertainty. Section 2 speci￿es the linear-quadratic robust control
framework. Section 3 gives the model and reveals the match of the model
to the data. Section 4 presents optimal rules under a range of assumptions
about the model and the policymaker￿ s preference for robustness. Finally,
section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Robust Control Framework
Throughout the paper, monetary policy is examined from the perspective
of the linear-quadratic optimal control framework. The central bank is as-
sumed to possess a set of goals or objectives for monetary policy. These
goals are achieved by setting the interest rate using a rule that responds
to the variables in the model of the economy. The behaviour of the econ-
omy acts as a constraint on the ability of the central bank in achieving its
goals. It is assumed that central bank preferences can be approximated by
a quadratic function and further, that the economy can be approximated by
a linear model. Under this set of assumptions, the optimal interest rate rule
will be unique.
4Open economy robust control experiments include Sargent￿ s (1999)? analysis of the
Ball (1999)? model and Leitemo and S￿derstr￿m (2004)?, who attain analytical solutions
to the robust control problem for the purely forward-looking open economy new Keynesian
model developed by Clarida et. al. (2001)? and Gal￿ and Monacelli (2004)?.
4Giordani and S￿derlind (2004) provide a convenient exposition of solu-
tion methods for the robust control problem under commitment, discretion
and simple monetary policy rules. Here we represent an outline of their
solution method, assuming that the central bank implements policy under
discretion. The speci￿cation of the problem hinges on the addition of the
mechanism of an ￿evil agent￿ , that represents nature and introduces feared




















t+1￿t+1 ￿ ￿0: (3)
The matrix Q captures the central banks preference for minimising the vari-
ance of particular state variables; the matrix R represents the central bank￿ s
preferences for minimising the variance of the policy instrument (most typ-
ically the nominal interest rate); and the matrix U captures any preference
over the covariance between state variables and the instrument. In practice,
this proves useful for capturing a preference for interest rate smoothing. The
matrix A0 captures contemporaneous relationships between the state vari-
ables, A1 encapsulates lagged relationships while the matrix B1 gives the
impact of the policy instrument on the state variables. It is assumed that
the initial state vector, x0; is given.
Relative to standard linear-quadratic control, the key introduction is
the sequence of misspeci￿cation errors ￿t+1 that the evil agent sets as a
rule. These misspeci￿cation errors apply to equations that have the usual
5errors attached and represent relationships the policymaker regards with
uncertainty. The matrix C1 determines the magnitude of the errors at-
tached to each equation while the evil agent determines the dynamics of the
misspeci￿cation errors, constrained by equation (3) which states that these
misspeci￿cation errors must be bounded in magnitude by ￿0:
Hansen and Sargent (2004)? and Giordani and S￿derlind (2004) show
that the problem speci￿ed in equations (1), (2) and (3) can be represented
in a rational expectations, linear quadratic state space form, so that the
problem can be treated with standard techniques. With the constraint on


















s:t: xt+1 = Axt + B￿u￿





















where A = A￿1
0 A1; B = A￿1
0 B1 and C = A￿1
0 C1: The parameter ￿ represents
the policymakers preference for robustness. A low value for ￿ represents a
large concern for model uncertainty while the standard case of no concern
for uncertainty is recovered for ￿ = 1: This parameter maps directly to ￿0;
e⁄ectively specifying the bounds on the behaviour of the evil agent ￿ a low
value of ￿ translate to a relatively high value of ￿0 implying the evil agent
is less constrained.
Applying standard rational expectations solution techniques to the prob-
6lem yields a policy rule for the central bank and a rule for the misspeci￿ca-
tion errors induced by the evil agent, both of which are expressed as a linear
function of the state variables. That is,
u￿
t = ￿Fxt (7)
where u￿











where Fu represents the policy rule for the central bank and F￿ gives the
rule used by the evil agent. In summary, under robust control, the evil
agent chooses a rule for implementing worst case dynamics, given the central
bank￿ s preference for robustness, while the central bank chooses a rule that
minimises its loss function assuming the evil agent implements the plausible
worst case dynamics.
Under the robust control framework there are two sets of model dynamics
that should be considered: (i) the worst case dynamics, whereby the central
bank slants their rule against feared misspeci￿cation errors that occur; and
(ii) the approximating dynamics, where the central bank slants their rule
against feared misspeci￿cation dynamics that are unfounded and do not
eventuate. The dynamics of the model under the worst case model can be
expressed as:
xt+1 = Mwxt + C￿t+1 (9)
where:
Mw = A ￿ BFu ￿ CF￿: (10)
7The dynamics of the approximating model are not a⁄ected by the machina-
tions of the evil agent and can be represented as:
xt+1 = Maxt + C￿t+1 (11)
where:
Ma = A ￿ BFu: (12)
Of course, the extent of the material di⁄erence between the two sets of
dynamics depends on the extent to which the policymaker fears misspeci-
￿cation dynamics and desires a rule that is robust to this misspeci￿cation.
The following section details a useful method for parameterising the policy-
maker￿ s concerns.
2.1 How much robustness?
What is the appropriate choice of ￿ for the policymaker? The policymaker
desires a rule that is robust to models that are di¢ cult to distinguish from
the policymaker￿ s approximate model of the economy. The central bank can
be over-insured ￿ if it adopts a rule robust to misspeci￿cation errors so
unlikely to occur as to warrant discarding these processes from the realm
of possible models. E⁄ectively, the econometrician ￿rst chooses an error
detection probability, the probability of making an error in distinguishing
the alternative model from the true model, which re￿ ects the concern of
the policymaker not to overinsure by using rules robust against implausible
models.
In order to map a sequence of error detection probabilities to a sequence
of robustness parameters, Hansen and Sargent (2004) advocate using log-
8likelihood ratios of the approximating model against the worst case model.
For a ￿xed sample of observations, Hansen and Sargent (2004) de￿ne Lij as
the likelihood of that sample for model j under the assumption that model






De￿ne the approximating model, equation (12), as model A, and the worst-
case model, equation (10), as model B. Consider drawing repeated samples.
There are two kinds of mistakes that can be made in attempting to determine
which model generated the sample data. Firstly, model A could be the true
data-generating process yet for a given sample, the log likelihood may be
negative. It is possible to calculate the probability of making this mistake
in repeated sampling:
pA = Pr(mistake=A) = freq(rA ￿ 0) (14)
i.e., the frequency of generating negative log-likelihood ratios is the prob-
ability of mistaking model B for model A, when model A is the true data
generating process. Secondly model A may be mistaken for model B such
that:
pB = Pr(mistake=B) = freq(rB ￿ 0): (15)
The probabilities of a mistake, pA and pB; are functions of the di⁄erence
between the approximating model, equation (12), and the worst-case model,
equation (10), which is a function of the robustness parameter, ￿: The prob-
ability of detecting a di⁄erence between the approximating model and the




(pA + pB): (16)
9The next step is to calculate the map between the error detection prob-
abilities and the robustness parameter. Firstly choose an appropriate value
for the error detection probability.5 Given the error detection probability,
calculate the preference for robustness ￿ using the map. Following Hansen
and Sargent (2004) a risk sensitivity parameter is de￿ned where the risk
sensitivity parameter ￿ = ￿￿￿1: When ￿ = 0 the robustness parameter
is in￿nite and the model conforms to the standard case. When the risk
sensitivity parameter is negative, there exists a preference for a robust rule.
3 The Model
3.1 Theoretical model
McCallum and Nelson (1999)? show how an IS equation, derived from a
consumption Euler equation, implies that the output gap is a function of
agents￿expectations of the output gap in addition to the real interest rate.
However, this view of the output gap process is generally inconsistent with
the ￿nding that the output gap displays substantial persistence in the data.
Fuhrer (2000)? shows that the addition of habit formation to the utility
function for consumers implies that the lag of output enters the optimizing IS
equation. If we appeal to inertia on the part of decision making on the part of
consumers and lag the real interest rate, we obtain a closed economy output
gap equation largely constructed from structural parameters yet su¢ ciently
￿ exible to replicate the persistence in output gap data.
In addition, McCallum and Nelson (1999) derive an open economy ver-
sion of their optimizing closed economy IS equation that implies the output
5Typically the literature has settled on error detection probabilities of 10 and 20 per
cent (see Hansen and Sargent (2002)? and Giordani and S￿derlind (2004)?, for example).
10gap is a function of the real exchange rate, foreign output, the expectation
of the real exchange rate and the expectation of foreign output gap. Simpli-
fying open economy e⁄ects to the lag of the real exchange rate, the output
gap equation takes the following form:
~ yt = ￿1Et~ yt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)~ yt￿1 ￿ ￿2rt￿1 ￿ ￿3qt￿1 + "~ yt (17)
where ~ yt represents the output gap, rt is a long term real interest rate and qt
represent the real exchange rate ￿ an increase in qt represents an exchange
rate appreciation. All the coe¢ cients are positive according to theory. The
long term ex ante real interest rate is de￿ned using a risk neutral arbitrage
condition so that the long rate is the sum of the sequence of expected short










Et(it+s ￿ ￿t+1+s) (18)
where d de￿nes the number of quarters for the e⁄ective long term real inter-
est rate (see S￿derlind (1999)? for an empirical example of this de￿nition
of the long term real interest rate).
A hybrid new-Keynesian Phillips curve is used to model domestic in-
￿ ation. Structural models of the Phillips curve can be derived from wage-
contracting behaviour on the part of ￿rms and workers (see Fuhrer (1997)?,
for example). These models suggest that workers form wage demand as
an average of the expected real wage and observed past real wages with a
mark-up in good times and a lower real wage in bad times, based on the
realization of the output gap. Alternatively, pricing behaviour on the part
of ￿rms (see Calvo (1983)? and Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) ?) can be used to
derive structural equations for in￿ ation that contain forward and backward-
11looking components. These behavioural assumptions generate hybrid do-
mestic in￿ ation equations similar to:
￿d
t = ￿1Et￿d
t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿1)￿d
t￿1 + ￿2~ yt￿1 + "￿dt (19)
where ￿d
t represents domestic in￿ ation. In￿ ation equations developed from
strict microfoundations predict a contemporaneous relationship between in-
￿ ation and the output gap but this is di¢ cult to reconcile with the data and
policy practitioners views of the transmission mechanism.
The foreign good component of in￿ ation is assumed to be a direct mark-





t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿qt (20)
where ￿
f
t is foreign in￿ ation and the parameter ￿ calibrates the degree of ex-
change rate pass-through. Finally, consumer price in￿ ation is a combination
of domestic price in￿ ation and foreign good in￿ ation, weighted according to
￿; the proportion of foreign goods in the consumer price index:
￿t = ￿￿
f
t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿d
t: (21)
The no arbitrage condition that is the basis of Uncovered Interest rate
Parity (UIP) forms a theoretically appealing structural relationship for mod-
elling the real exchange rate. However, this condition does not appear to
capture the predilection of the exchange rate to move through large, persis-
tent cycles and we allow for autocorrelated exchange rate errors. Thus the
real exchange rate equation is modelled by UIP:




t+1) + "qt: (22)
12while the exchange rate errors are modelled as AR(1) process:
"qt = ￿"qt￿1 + ￿t (23)
where ￿t is a standard normal error process.6
It remains to choose an appropriate calibration of the model to serve
as the laboratory for the robust control experiments to follow. The next
section calibrates the model, presenting the ￿t of the model to the data and
subsequently the calibration.
3.2 Model ￿t
The calibration is designed as a loose description of the data. In fact, a
single generic model calibration is used to broadly match the key features of
three datasets. Although, New Zealand was the ￿rst country in the world to
adopt an explicit in￿ ation targeting framework in February 1990, the model
is calibrated to data from the period 1992q1 to 2003q4.7 Australia, Canada
and New Zealand underwent disin￿ ationary periods that had largely ended
by the beginning of 1992. Asking the model to explain the disin￿ ation-
ary period is misleading because these data points are generated from an
alternative policy regime.
One criterion for model ￿t is the second moments implied by the model.
Rows 2 to 4 in table 1 below depict the standard deviations for in￿ ation,
HP-￿ltered output gap, real exchange rate and the nominal interest rate
6The autocorrelation can be interpreted as autocorrelation in a risk premium term.
7Canada adopted explicit in￿ ation targets in February 1991 and Australia two to three
years later. The Australian approach was more gradual ￿ Bernanke et al. (1999)?
characterize the Reserve Bank of Australia￿ s view as dating the adoption of in￿ ation
targeting in early 1993.
13Table 1: Model versus Data Standard Deviations
￿~ y ￿￿ ￿q ￿i
Model 1.068 0.840 1.447 1.268
Australia 0.801 1.014 1.415 1.094
Canada 1.117 0.508 1.468 1.546
New Zealand 1.583 0.901 1.547 2.215
for Australia, Canada and New Zealand.8 This is compared to standard
deviations based on a time series of 9,000 observations of model generated
data.9 The next three rows show the empirical standard deviations of these
variables observed over the period 1992q1 to 2003q4.
Looking at the ￿rst column of the table, it appears that the baseline
model gets the standard deviation about right ￿ the standard deviation
of the output gap implied by the baseline model is very close to the stan-
dard deviation observed in Canadian data. The New Zealand output gap
is about 50% more volatile than both the model and the Canadian data.
The standard deviation of in￿ ation implied by the model is close to that
of Australia and New Zealand, but overstates the volatility evident in the
Canadian data series. However, this is probably due to di⁄erences in core
8The HP ￿lter smoothing parameter is set to 1600 and the ￿lter applied to data 1985q1
to 2003q4 to mitigate some of the e⁄ects of the end point problem. The standard deviation
in the table are for the subsample 1992q1 to 2003q4. In￿ ation is annualized quarterly
consumer price in￿ ation in core in￿ ation measures, excluding volatile items for Australia
and weighted median measures for Canada and New Zealand. The real exchange rate
standard deviations are trade-weighted CPI based measures expressed in percentage terms.
The interest rate series are quarterly averages of monthly ninety day series.
9This was based on simulating 10,000 observations from the reduced form and discard-
ing the initial 1,000 observations. Initial period values are set to 0. The variance of the
domestic in￿ ation, output gap and exchange rate shocks are set to 0.5, as part of the
model calibration, detailed in the following subsection.
14measures of in￿ ation. The model appears to mimic the observed volatility in
the real exchange rate particularly well. Finally, the volatility in the nomi-
nal interest rate implies by the model gives a good match to the data and
is nested by the lower volatility in the Australian dataset and the slightly
higher volatilities for Canada and New Zealand.
The implied persistence of key state variables provides a second criterion
for model ￿t. Autocorrelation functions for observed data are compared to
autocorrelation functions for the same set of simulated data used to con-
struct table 1. The autocorrelation functions are shown in table 2.
The model matches the persistence observed in the Australian output
gap remarkably well. However, the corresponding autocorrelation functions
for Canadian and New Zealand data show slightly more persistence than the
model. Possibly the model appears to understate the degree of output gap
persistence. In addition, the persistence in the model is slightly higher than
the observed persistence in in￿ ation for all three countries. The model does
not match the strong persistence observed in the New Zealand exchange rate
but is broadly similar to the persistence for the Australian and Canadian
exchange rates. The model appears to slightly overstate the persistence in
the nominal interest rate for Australia and Canada but is representative of
the persistence observed in the New Zealand ninety day interest rate.
3.3 Model Calibration
The calibration that supports the model properties presented in tables 1
and 2 is relatively standard with one exception ￿ the lack of persistence
in the in￿ ation data implies a large role for expectations (a coe¢ cient of
0.7, more than double the weight on the coe¢ cient on the lag of domes-
15Table 2: Model versus Data Autocorrelation Functions
Lag length 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Panel 1 AC function for the output gap
Model 0.72 0.45 0.26 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.02
Australia 0.72 0.44 0.24 0.17 0.20 0.14 -0.06 -0.20
Canada 0.87 0.64 0.44 0.19 -0.01 -0.17 -0.31 -0.37
New Zealand 0.86 0.71 0.47 0.26 0.09 0.04 -0.12 -0.20
Panel 2 AC function for in￿ ation
Model 0.54 0.23 0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Australia 0.48 0.16 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.08 -0.09
Canada 0.45 0.25 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.06 -0.00 0.02
New Zealand 0.40 0.16 0.18 0.10 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.14
Panel 3 AC function for the exchange rate
Model 0.82 0.56 034 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.00 -0.04
Australia 0.75 0.60 0.45 0.34 0.15 0.05 0.00 -0.01
Canada 0.83 0.68 0.57 0.46 0.35 0.24 0.13 0.06
New Zealand 0.93 0.83 0.75 0.64 0.52 0.36 0.21 0.07
Panel 4 AC function for the nominal interest rate
Model 0.88 0.69 0.52 0.38 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.12
Australia 0.83 0.61 0.43 0.21 0.01 -0.12 -0.20 -0.25
Canada 0.77 0.56 0.39 0.08 -0.13 -0.18 -0.17 -0.07
New Zealand 0.83 0.58 0.38 0.24 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.07
16tic in￿ ation (0.3)) in the Phillips equation relative to the empirical liter-
ature. As Dennis and S￿derstr￿m (2002)? note, the literature has not
settled on an appropriate calibration for the forward-looking component in
the Phillips equation. Completely forward-looking in￿ ation equations have
di¢ culty explaining the persistence in US in￿ ation data. Ball (1999)? and
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) assume that the Phillips equation has no
forward-looking component. Other researchers, for example Fuhrer (1997)?,
Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) ?, Roberts (1997)? and LindØ (2001)?, suggest es-
timates on the forward-looking component to be in the range 0.1￿ 0.7.
In addition, the e⁄ect of the output gap on in￿ ation is calibrated to
0.1; incomplete pass-through from the exchange rate to the price of foreign
goods is modelled by setting ￿ = 0:8, and domestic and foreign goods are
weighted equally within the consumer price index, so ￿ = 0:5: Calibrating
serial correlation in the exchange rate errors, by setting ￿ = 0:8; is necessary
to explain the persistent deviations of the real exchange rate from UIP.
Within the IS equation, consumption has a high degree of persistence
from a large role for habit formation ￿ ￿1 = 0:1. This calibration is much
lower than the calibration of 0.5 in S￿derstr￿m et al. (2002)? and the
estimate of 0.3 in Fuhrer (2000)?, yet several researchers (S￿derlind (1999)?,
Rudebusch (2002) ?, Ball (1999)?) specify a zero weight on the forward-
looking component.
The sensitivity of the output gap to the real interest rate is set so that
￿2 = 0:1. This is half the calibrated value in the open economy of Ball
(1999), lower than the open economy calibration of 0.5 in Batini and Haldane
(1999) but slightly higher than the parameter estimated in S￿derlind (1999)
and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) ￿ both closed economy models. The
coe¢ cient on the lag of the real exchange rate, ￿3; is set to 0.2, twice the
17value in Ball (1999).
The variance of the shocks to the in￿ ation, output gap and exchange rate
error equations are set to 0.5. The baseline loss function for the central bank
is calibrated such that the central bank is twice as concerned with stabilizing
in￿ ation relative to stabilizing the output gap such that ￿1 = 0:5; and desires
interest rate smoothing ￿ ￿2 = 0:5: This is required to mimic the volatility
and persistence in the nominal interest rate series. No weight on minimising
the real exchange rate was required to match the data.
4 Robust policies
4.1 Robust rules
Prior to constructing robust rules, an appropriate preference for robustness
must be obtained via the calculation of error detection probabilities. Figure
1 presents the map from error detection probabilities to the risk sensitivity
parameter under the baseline model. Reading the solid black line to the
x-axis, we see that an error detection probability of 0.1 is associated with
a degree of risk aversion of -0.328 which maps to a robustness parameter
of 3.05, under the assumption that the observed data sample contains sixty
time periods.
When the policymaker desires a rule robust against models that have
at least a 20% chance of generating the observed data, the error detection
probability of 0.2 is associated with a degree of risk aversion of -0.229 and a
robustness parameter of 4.36. Thus a policymaker that demands rules robust
to a smaller set of models, is less risk averse and has a higher robustness
parameter that bounds the nature of the worst case dynamics the evil agent
can generate.
18Figure 1: Baseline Error Detection Probabilities
19Robust rules for the baseline model are presented in the ￿rst section
of table 3. The standard rule ￿ with no preference for robustness ￿ is
labelled ￿F￿and presented in the ￿rst row of the table. The appropriate
interest rate response (in percentage point terms) to the state variables in
the model, labelled at the head of each column, are contained within each
cell of the table. For example, the baseline rule indicates that the nominal
interest rate should be increased 0.157 percentage points in response to a
unit shock to domestic in￿ ation.
Sensibly, the baseline rule indicates that the nominal interest rate should
be lowered in response to a positive real exchange shock, the lag of the real
exchange rate and lowered a little if the lag of the long term real interest
rate is above its equilibrium value. The interest rate should be increased
in response to positive shocks to the output and domestic in￿ ation. The
response to the lag of the output gap is substantially more aggressive than
the corresponding response to the lag of domestic in￿ ation, re￿ ecting the
large role for in￿ ation expectations within the Phillips equation. Finally,
the coe¢ cient on the lag of the nominal interest rate is 0.33 ￿ noticeably
lower than many other studies.10
The second row of the table, labelled ￿F(20%)"; presents the robust rule
associated with an error detection probability of 20%. That the rule rec-
ommends more aggressive policy is immediately apparent. The response to
a domestic in￿ ation shock approximately doubles to 0.340, the response to
the exchange rate and output gap shocks increase substantially. This atten-
uated policy response is consistent across each of the state variables with
one exception ￿ the rule suggests less interest rate smoothing. Robust poli-
10See for example, Lansing (2000)?, Sack and Wieland (2000)?, and Rudebusch (2002)?.
20cies for open economy in￿ ation targeters are more aggressive than standard
rules.
That robust policy calls for attenuated policy within the model, is un-
derlined by the rule associated with an error detection probability of 10%.
Interest rate smoothing is reduced and the response to the other state vari-
ables increases markedly. For example, the response to the domestic in￿ ation
shock is about triple the response under the standard rule.
The rules F("￿); F("q) and F("~ y) show the result of alternative sets of
restrictions on the misspeci￿cation dynamics that sets the variance of all
but the bracketed shock equal to zero. For example rule F("￿) sets the
variance of the output gap and exchange rate shocks to zero. This restricts
the evil agent to inducing misspeci￿cation in only the in￿ ation equation. Of
course, under standard policy with no preference for robustness, certainty
equivalence applies and the policy rule will be identical to the baseline rule.
However, within the robust control framework, certainty equivalence does
not hold because restricting the dimensions of the shocks appended to each
equation acts as an additional constraint on the behaviour of the evil agent.
The set of rules obtained under restricted misspeci￿cation dynamics are
generally more aggressive than the baseline although there are exceptions.
For example, when the central bank is assumed to have a relatively small
weight on interest rate smoothing (loss function (ii), in table 3), the model
that restricts the evil agent to misspeci￿cation in the real exchange rate
equation indicates that policy should respond less aggressively to all but the
real exchange shock. This result echoes the ￿nding of Leitemo and S￿der-
str￿m (2004)? who ￿nd that the policy response should be mitigated when
the misspeci￿cation dynamics originate in the real exchange rate equation
only.
21Table 3: Optimal and Robust Rules: Baseline Model
Rule e￿dt eqt e~ yt ~ yt￿1 ￿d
t￿1 qt￿1 it￿1 ￿
f
t Rt￿1
Loss function (i): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:5￿i2
t
F 0.157 -0.575 0.548 0.509 0.047 -0.186 0.330 0.051 -0.055
F(20%) 0.340 -0.640 0.825 0.777 0.102 -0.359 0.246 0.131 -0.083
F(10%) 0.457 -0.683 1.005 0.950 0.137 -0.471 0.186 0.181 -0.101
F("￿) 0.711 -0.702 1.071 1.035 0.213 -0.623 0.058 0.283 -0.107
F("q) 0.186 -0.727 0.655 0.608 0.056 -0.228 0.168 0.062 -0.065
F("~ y) 0.230 -0.580 0.755 0.703 0.069 -0.289 0.316 0.084 -0.076
Loss function (ii): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:1￿i2
t
F 0.231 -0.745 0.755 0.703 0.069 -0.238 0.192 0.077 -0.076
F(20%) 0.553 -0.757 1.137 1.079 0.166 -0.511 0.160 0.224 -0.114
F(10%) 0.714 -0.763 1.303 1.244 0.214 -0.643 0.141 0.294 -0.130
F("￿) 0.808 -0.774 1.164 1.128 0.242 -0.649 0.124 0.329 -0.116
F("q) 0.224 -0.809 0.749 0.696 0.067 -0.230 0.123 0.076 -0.075
F("~ y) 0.302 -0.731 0.949 0.885 0.091 -0.336 0.197 0.111 -0.095
Loss function (iii): Lt = ￿2
t + ~ y2
t + ￿i2
t
F 0.126 -0.519 0.533 0.492 0.038 -0.181 0.376 0.038 -0.053
F(10%) 0.253 -0.596 0.738 0.689 0.076 -0.304 0.277 0.090 -0.074
F(20%) 0.338 -0.638 0.860 0.808 0.101 -0.382 0.208 0.125 -0.086
F("￿) 0.440 4.091 0.650 0.629 0.132 -0.377 0.160 0.161 -0.065
F("q) 0.144 -0.620 0.603 0.557 0.043 -0.208 0.266 0.043 -0.060
F("~ y) 0.159 -0.533 0.656 0.606 0.048 -0.235 0.358 0.052 -0.066





F 0.184 -0.669 0.646 0.600 0.055 -0.296 0.243 0.056 -0.065
F(20%) 0.235 -0.685 0.942 0.871 0.070 -0.388 0.204 0.078 -0.094
F(10%) 0.262 -0.689 1.135 1.048 0.079 -0.445 0.184 0.090 -0.113
F("￿) 0.498 -0.795 1.743 1.619 0.150 -0.716 -0.017 0.183 -0.174
F("q) 0.194 -0.756 0.067 0.619 0.058 -0.305 0.159 0.057 -0.067
F("~ y) 0.203 -0.665 0.838 0.775 0.061 -0.347 0.232 0.064 -0.084
NB.Under the baseline rule, there is no preference for robustness and ￿ = 1:
224.2 Robust Control Dynamics
To illuminate the di⁄erences in model dynamics when the policymaker adopts
typically more aggressive robust rules against unknown misspeci￿cation er-
rors, the dynamics of the model are depicted in ￿gure 2 for three alternative
scenarios. The standard case, where the policymaker does not in fact slant
their rule against misspeci￿cation is depicted with a solid black line. The
case where the policymaker slants the rule against unknown errors that do
not eventuate, such that the underlining model of the constraint is the ap-
proximating model, is depicted with a dashed line. The worst case scenario,
where the misspeci￿cation errors that are feared by the policymaker even-
tuate and the evil agent￿ s rule for nature is incorporated into the underlying
model of the economy, is depicted with the dotted line.
Firstly, turn to the ￿rst row of ￿gure 2 and examine the response of
the key macroeconomic variables to an output gap shock. The behaviour of
the output gap following the output gap shock is broadly similar across the
three alternative scenarios. After the initial output gap shock, the output
gap decreases, falling to zero approximately four to six quarters after the
shock. Under the worst case scenario, when the feared misspeci￿cation errors
occur, the output gap remains above the baseline case for a period of time
but this di⁄erence is barely discernible. Under the approximating scenario,
where the worst-case misspeci￿cation dynamics do not occur, the output
gap is returned to zero slightly more quickly than the standard case.
For the standard case, domestic in￿ ation increases relatively sharply ini-
tially before returning towards zero after approximately four quarters. The
initial increase in domestic in￿ ation is more pronounced under the worst case
model and domestic in￿ ation remains substantially higher for a number of
23Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions
24periods than under the standard case.
This is because the evil agent, aiming to maximise the loss of the central
bank, delivers dynamics that increase the persistence of both the output gap
shock and domestic in￿ ation. To protect against these feared, misspeci￿ca-
tion dynamics the policymaker slants their rule. If these misspeci￿cation
errors do not in fact occur, yet the policymaker uses a rule slanted against
feared misspeci￿ed dynamics a third permutation arises, depicted with a
dashed line. Under this scenario, domestic in￿ ation increases initially yet is
returned towards target rapidly and actually falls below the path of domestic
in￿ ation for the standard case.
Turning to the behaviour of the real exchange rate, in response to the
output gap shock, there is little discernible di⁄erence in the behaviour of
the real exchange rate across the three alternative scenarios. Recall that
the baseline loss function does not include the real exchange rate. Given a
limited e⁄ective budget to manipulate the model￿ s dynamics, the evil agent
focuses their activities on manipulating the persistence of the process that
a⁄ect the paths of the key macroeconomic variables that enter the central
bank￿ s loss function.
The response of the nominal interest rate is revealing about how the
aggressiveness of the robust policy rule begins to translate into the three
alternative dynamic structures. Under the standard model, the nominal
interest rate ticks up approximately 30 basis points in response to the output
gap shock before decreasing close to zero after about eight quarters. The
initial response of the nominal interest rate under the approximating and
worst case model is stronger ￿ an increase of approximately 50 basis points.
Note that the initial increase in the nominal interest rate is identical under
both the approximating and worst case models because the policy rule is
25identical and the misspeci￿cation dynamics take time to impact on the paths
of the variables. After the initial increase, the nominal interest rate decreases
particularly rapidly under the approximating model, passing under the path
of the standard model between three and four quarters. Under the worst
case model, the machinations of the evil agent results in dynamics that force
the nominal interest rate to remain about 25 basis points higher than the
approximating model until about six quarters when this implied di⁄erential
in the interest rate path begins to dissipate.
That the worst case dynamics map into a higher loss for the central bank
can be seen in table 4. The table depicts the losses under the approximating
and worst case models for a range of central bank preferences, robustness
preferences and a range of constraints on the nature of the misspeci￿cation
dynamics.
Table 4: Loss Comparison under Robust Policy: Baseline Model
20% 10% e￿ e~ y eq
Loss function (i): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:5￿i2
t
Ms 72.82 72.82 15.73 49.99 7.10
Ma 88.45 97.37 27.48 63.82 9.05
Mw 89.54 102.57 37.28 58.44 9.08
Loss function (ii): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:1￿i2
t
Ms 62.27 62.27 15.46 44.85 1.96
Ma 80.72 75.66 24.53 50.49 2.14
Mw 86.35 77.96 29.28 53.22 2.15
Loss function (iii): Lt = ￿2
t + ~ y2
t + ￿i2
t
Ms 108.79 108.79 16.06 80.20 12.52
Ma 124.45 135.98 26.55 84.70 14.71
Mw 126.64 136.40 32.32 92.85 15.08
Loss function (iv): Lt = ￿2




Ms 210.46 210.46 16.78 176.38 17.30
Ma 258.21 300.85 25.68 209.47 19.46
Mw 284.16 336.26 32.26 240.12 19.62
26Firstly, the table shows that the loss the central bank incurs is always
higher when the evil agent is able to implement the worst case dynamics.
This of course is unsurprising because the task of the evil agent is to induce
misspeci￿ed dynamics that impact negatively on the loss the central bank
occurs.
Secondly, we can observe an increase in the loss when the central bank
begins to slant their rule against misspeci￿ed dynamics ￿ even when the
worst case dynamics do not eventuate. This can be observed in the second
row of table 4 where the loss increases by about 20% when the central bank
slants their rule against misspeci￿ed dynamics that have an error detection
probability of 20%.
4.3 The exchange rate transmission channel
A key feature of the small open economy new Keynesian model is that the
policymaker can no longer perfectly o⁄set demand shocks. Interest rate
changes alter the exchange rate which plays a direct role in determining
in￿ ation via the price of foreign good component of the consumer price
index. Although the link between the interest rate and exchange rate may
hinder the central bank in the face of demand shocks, this link opens the
exchange rate channel to the central bank, enhancing the e⁄ectiveness of
policy via the impact of the exchange rate on both the output gap and
in￿ ation.
This section explores a particularly simple experiment for examining the
role of the exchange rate channel for in￿ ation targeters, operating under
uncertainty. The exchange rate channel is closed o⁄ by setting the para-
meters of the model in a manner that allows no role of the exchange rate
27Table 5: Optimal and Robust Rules: Baseline Model
Rule e￿dt eqt e~ yt ~ yt￿1 ￿d
t￿1 qt￿1 it￿1 ￿
f
t Rt￿1
Loss function (i): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:5￿i2
t
Baseline￿ 0.252 0 1.429 1.312 0.076 0 0.778 0 -0.143
Robust (i) 0.507 0 2.549 2.345 0.152 0 0.678 0 -0.255
Robust (ii) 0.676 0 3.332 3.066 0.203 0 0.606 0 -0.333
Robust ("￿) 1.087 0 4.954 4.457 0.326 0 0.455 0 -0.495
Robust ("~ y) 0.378 0 2.021 1.857 0.113 0 0.727 0 -0.202
Loss function (ii): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:1￿i2
t
Baseline￿ 0.618 0 2.458 2.274 0.185 0 0.743 0 -0.246
Robust (i) 1.299 0 4.324 4.021 0.390 0 0.632 0 -0.432
Robust (ii) 1.788 0 5.779 5.380 0.536 0 0.544 0 -0.578
Robust ("￿) 2.300 0 6.930 6.467 0.690 0 0.466 0 -0.693
Robust ("~ y) 0.881 0 3.264 3.026 0.264 0 0.700 0 -0.326
Loss function (iii): Lt = ￿2
t + ~ y2
t + ￿i2
t
Baseline￿ 0.166 0 1.193 1.090 0.050 0 0.790 0 -0.119
Robust (i) 0.331 0 2.096 1.919 0.099 0 0.695 0 -0.210
Robust (ii) 0.424 0 2.627 2.407 0.127 0 0.639 0 -0.263
Robust ("￿) 0.781 0 4.243 3.897 0.234 0 0.452 0 -0.424
Robust ("~ y) 0.251 0 1.703 1.558 0.075 0 0.739 0 -0.170
NB. ￿Under the baseline rule, there is no preference for robustness and ￿ = 1:
￿￿The rules robust to e￿ shocks only is robust at the 33% error detection
probability.
￿ shifting the model from an open economy paradigm to a closed econ-
omy world.11 Clearly this model will no longer approximate the data for
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The exercise is simply a hypotheti-
cal experiment to facilitate comparison between closed economy and open
economy worlds.
11Practically, the component of foreign goods in the consumer price index is set to zero,
￿ = 1; the role of the exchange rate in determining the output gap removed, ￿3 = 0; and
exchange rate shocks completely removed from the model.
28That the exchange rate channel is useful is evident in table 6, which
depicts the expected loss under the closed economy model for a range of loss
function speci￿cations and restrictions on the nature of the misspeci￿cation
dynamics. Clearly, the central bank prefers to operate within the open
economy world relative to its closed economy counterpart. The loss under
the standard case is 289.43 ￿ about 4 times the loss under the open economy
model (72.43).
Turning to the baseline reaction function for the closed economy model
(row 1 in table 6), there is no response to the lag of the exchange rate,
the exchange rate shock, and the foreign good component of domestic in-
￿ ation because these variables no longer a⁄ect the transmission mechanism.
The coe¢ cients on the remaining state variables have identical signs but are
larger than their counterparts in the small open economy model The poli-
cymaker must respond more aggressively to the state variables to stabilise
the economy in the absence of an exchange rate transmission channel.
A preference for robustness enhances this relative aggression observed
in the closed economy rules. Relatively extreme responses for the nominal
interest rate are implied. This result holds when misspeci￿cation dynamics
are included in the analysis. Similar increases in the loss can be observed
when the policymaker slants their rule when they fear ￿ to di⁄erent degrees
￿ model misspeci￿cation. There is a substantial increase in the loss the
central bank incurs when operating within the closed economy world both
for the standard and robust cases.
29Table 6: Loss Comparison under Robust Policy: Baseline Model
20% 10% e￿ e~ y
Loss function (i): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:5￿i2
t
Ms 289.43 289.43 59.91 229.52
Ma 418.86 510.98 85.20 268.21
Mw 453.46 561.59 101.73 313.84
Loss function (ii): Lt = ￿2
t + 0:5~ y2
t + 0:1￿i2
t
Ms 189.72 189.72 58.85 130.87
Ma 269.73 334.19 82.24 144.46
Mw 279.24 343.95 97.56 167.99
Loss function (iii): Lt = ￿2
t + ~ y2
t + ￿i2
t
Ms 410.23 410.23 60.46 349.76
Ma 568.06 665.74 86.27 404.03
Mw 636.34 764.24 103.05 478.99
5 Concluding Remarks
The calibration of the small open economy new Keynesian model to data
from Australia, Canada and New Zealand proves a useful testing ground for
identifying robust policies for open economy in￿ ation targeters. The cali-
brated model appears capable of capturing key features of the Australian,
Canadian and New Zealand data over the majority of the in￿ ation targeting
period in these countries. A comparatively high weight on in￿ ation expecta-
tions within the Phillips equation appears necessary to capture the relative
lack of persistence in in￿ ation compared to US data. This results in pol-
icy responding particularly strongly to the output gap relative to domestic
in￿ ation.
Robust policies are found to tend to translate into responding more ag-
gressively to the macroeconomy and reduced interest rate smoothing. This
30￿nding broadly holds when the nature of model uncertainty is restricted to
particular equations within the model. But, this is not a general result ￿
when the central bank places a relatively low weight on interest smoothing
and misspeci￿cation is restricted to the exchange rate equation, mitigation
of the policy response is suggested.
Finally, the role of the exchange rate channel is explored within a closed
economy counterpart of the baseline model. For the parameterisation of un-
certainty within the paper, the uncertainty that surrounds the UIP condition
is not su¢ cient to o⁄set the bene￿t of enhanced e⁄ectiveness of monetary
policy. According to the expected sum of discounted future losses, the cen-
tral bank prefers the open economy, with its concomitant UIP uncertainty,
over the closed economy environment. The closed economy consistently sug-
gests more aggressive policy.
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